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ABSTRACT
The modern automobile relies on numerous electronic control units
communicating over the de facto standard of the controller area net-
work (CAN) bus. This communication network was not developed
with cybersecurity in mind. Many methods based on constant time
intervals between messages have been proposed to address this
lack of security issue with the CAN bus. However, these existing
methods may struggle to handle variable time intervals between
messages during transitions of vehicle driving modes. This paper
proposes a simple and cost-effective method to ensure the secu-
rity of the CAN bus that is based on constant message frequencies
across vehicle driving modes. This proposed method does not re-
quire any modifications on the existing CAN bus and it is designed
with the intent for efficient execution in platforms with very limited
computational resources. Test results with the proposed method
against two different vehicles and a frequency domain analysis are
also presented in the paper.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The modern automobile consists of more than 70 electronic control
units (ECUs) that communicate and interact with each other over
automotive bus systems [2]. Passenger comforts, infotainment fea-
tures, and connectivity continue to progress through the growth
and integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. However,
the benefits of increased connectivity and features comes with
the penalty of vulnerabilities [13], as demonstrated in Figure 1.
There is a lack of security preventing attacks against comfort and
infotainment features from compromising safety-critical control
systems [3]. Cyber attacks on automotive in-vehicle networks have
risen [1, 3] and this has driven a need for security in vehicles. Miller
and Valasek demonstrated their ability to control a Jeep Cherokee
remotely through a cellular network, leading to the recall of over a
million vehicles [8].
Most CAN messages are transmitted at fixed time intervals by
design, which makes the message traffic predictable. Many methods
for anomaly detection rely on this specific characteristic of CAN
for intrusion detection. However, as we will demonstrate in Section
3, during transitions of vehicle driving modes, time intervals be-
tween messages can change. Therefore, methods based on constant
intervals between messages will fail during transitions of vehicle
driving modes.
In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of using constant
CAN message frequencies for anomaly detection. We demonstrate
that CAN message frequencies are close to constant, even during
transitions of vehicle driving modes. We also perform a frequency
analysis to assess the frequency components of CAN messages. We
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Figure 1: Automotive attack surfaces.
conclude that message frequencies are a better indicator for anom-
aly detection than time intervals used in many existing methods.
Our key contributions are as follows:
• We demonstrate that time intervals between messages can
vary during transitions of vehicle driving modes
• We propose a new simple method to ensure the security
of the CAN bus that is based on constant message frequen-
cies across vehicle driving modes that does not require any
modifications on the existing CAN bus.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we discuss automotive intrusion detection systems (IDS). Then,
section 3 outlines the method of utilizing constant time interval
between messages as the detection feature for automotive intru-
sion detection and its flaws. In section 4, we present the proposed
frequency-based method for intrusion detection and its frequency
analysis results with Fourier Transform. In section 5, we outline
recent research into the security of CAN bus. In section 6, we sum-
marize the paper and discuss our planned future work.
2 AUTOMOTIVE THREAT AND
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
We investigate the most common type of attack, message injection,
in this paper. This attack can take control of a vehicle’s driving
operations. The basic idea is that an attacker transmits a packet
with the same ID as a legitimate packet as soon as the legitimate
packet is transmitted. This will cause other ECUs on the CAN bus
to use the data from the attacker’s injected message instead of
the legitimate one. Even when an attacker is injecting messages,
the ECUs still send their messages periodically. Eventually, the
rate of messages on the network will be increased by a factor of
more than 2 to 100 times, depending on the attacker’s injection
speed. Miller and Valasek reported that they needed to inject at
a rate of at least 20 times faster than normal for their attack to
be successful [8]. Because the original ECU is still transmitting its
message, an attacker needs to send messages at a fast enough rate
to overwrite the normal message with the same ID.
Development of an anomaly-based intrusion detection system
(IDS) typically starts with a training or normal model of the mon-
itored system’s activity. The IDS compares the current system’s
activity to the past captured normal model to detect variations in
behavior and label those deviations as anomalies. Any deviation
not captured in the normal profile could be correctly or mistakenly
identified as an intrusion. Having the most complete normal profile
is important, so the system does not suffer from high rates of false
positives or negatives. The use of anomalies to infer intrusions
suffers from a few key challenges:
• Defining a normal model that encompasses all possible ex-
pected behavior is extremely difficult. The boundary between
normal and anomalous behavior is often blurred.
• Normal continues to evolve, and what is normal currently
may not be so in the future.
• Anomalies may not be a result of malicious actions. Data
often contains noise which may produce anomalies that can
be difficult to distinguish from attacks.
• Attackers try to mask their actions to appear normal, there-
fore making the task of defining a tight boundary around
normal more important, and more difficult.
In the following sections, we will detail how we developed, imple-
mented, and evaluated our IDS to address this threat vector.
3 MESSAGE INTERVAL INTRUSION
DETECTION
Numerous works [9, 10, 12] utilize CAN message timing intervals
for intrusion detection. The detection process for using CAN mes-
sage timing intervals is detailed in Figure 2. The anomaly detector
usually has two modes - one mode to capture the normal timing
intervals for every CAN message and another intrusion detection
mode that observes current CAN traffic and compares its message
timings to the normal model to detect anomalies. To train the nor-
mal model, a few seconds of normal anomaly-free CAN traffic is
used to train the IDS. For each CAN ID, the IDS will calculate the
interval time, the difference from the previous message time to the
current message time, and the average interval time is calculated
as shown in Equation (1).
µ =
(∑ni=1 ti − ti−1)
n
(1)
3.1 Message Interval Evaluation
In order to demonstrate the utilization of message intervals as the
detection feature, we utilized a traffic capture of normal operation
of two vehicles and analyzed the normal message interval timings
for all CAN messages. The data set for our first test vehicle is
the live vehicle capture data published by Miller and Valasek [8].
This data set contained the CAN traffic of their test vehicle during
normal operations. The message injection attacks are simulated by
injecting specific messages to create data sets of malicious CAN
traffic. During simulations, we can control the rate of injection to
allow multi-rate injection attacks and evaluation of the various
injection rates. Additionally, we simulated single CAN ID injection
along with multiple CAN message ID injection at multiple rates.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect message injection has on the message
time interval.
To evaluate the IDS based on constant interval timings, the IDS
is trained with CAN traffic to build a normal model for all CAN
message interval timings. We then applied this IDS against our
simulated data sets of message injection attacks. We tested this
simple IDS against multiple rates of injection: 2, 5, and 20 times
faster than normal values. It was reported that 20 times faster rate
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Figure 3: Demonstrating message injection attacks affect-
ing the timings of messages. The simulated attack messages
have fluctuating message timings and are shorter than nor-
mal depending on rate of injection.
was required for successful attack [8], but we tested for slower rates
because we have previously observed a successful attack with a rate
of injection of only 2 times faster. Table 1 reports the detection accu-
racy and false positive rates across the variety of message injection
speeds and attacks. Detection accuracy is defined as the number of
CAN messages that were correctly identified as having anomalous
timings and the false positive rate is the number of incorrectly
identified CAN ID messages out of the total messages. Our results
show that the faster the rate of injection, the higher the detection
rate of anomalies. However, the message timing interval-based IDS
also generated increasing false positives when the injection rate in-
creased. Greater injection rate affects the timings of the other CAN
messages due to the presence of the additional injected messages.
The data set for our second test was obtained from a vehicle
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The data set was constructed
by logging CAN traffic through the ODB-II port of a real sedan
while driving on a dynamometer system, which simulates real road
operation. Attacks were performed by injecting malicious messages
at high rate to override normal vehicle operations. The malicious
messages were constructed by sniffing and spoofing legitimate
messages transmitted on the bus. We discovered there were two
major issues in the message timing intervals for this second test
vehicle.
(1) There were several messages that demonstrated multiple
timing intervals. It was assumed that CAN messages have
a singular consistent message interval. Numerous previous
Table 1: Message Timing Interval Detection Accuracy for
Single and Multiple CAN ID Injection Attacks
Attack
Type
Message
ID
Injection
Speed
Detection
Accuracy
False
Positive
Single
Message
Injection
0440
2× 75% 0%
5× 94% 11%
20× 99% 5%
Multiple
Message
Injection
0440
and
03D3
2× 0440: 75% 0%03D3: 68.75% 0%
5× 0440: 94% 0%03D3: 97.5% 0%
20× 0440: 99.5% 6.6%03D3: 99.4% 6.6%
Figure 4: Multiple CAN messages show varying message
intervals. Some messages show multiple distinct intervals
while some vary due to changes in vehicle operations.
work stated that all CAN messages have consistent timing
intervals [3, 8, 9].
(2) A few CANmessages also had their message timing intervals
vary depending on the vehicle’s behavior. We expected some
variation in the interval but the change that was seen was
greater than twice the normal rate.
When the IDSwas applied to the data set from vehicle 2, it generated
30 percent false positives, with 41 other message IDs detected as
anomalous. These poor results were caused by the inconsistencies
in the message timing intervals.
For example, in the CAN data set for the second test vehicle,
several CAN messages showed non-periodic and multiple timing
intervals. Figure 4 illustrates that multiple CAN IDs have vary-
ing message intervals. The data set for vehicle 2 had 137 different
CAN messages, and about 30 of these messages showed the in-
consistencies in the message timing intervals. The differences in
CAN message timing behavior and required injection attack rates
between the test vehicles may indicate that CAN may differ de-
pending on manufacturer and vehicle. This inconsistent behavior is
problematic for anomaly detection algorithms that are based on the
assumption of consistent and constant message timing intervals.
4 MESSAGE FREQUENCY DETECTION
We observed that the frequency of the messages remained relatively
consistent, even while the CAN message intervals varied. Addition-
ally, we noticed that the number of messages stays consistent even
as the vehicle changes modes of operation. Thus, we hypothesize
the rate of messages is a better indicator for anomaly detection
compared to message interval.
Our proposed anomaly detectionmethod is based on themessage
frequency: frequency (f ) is equal to the rate of messages (m) trans-
mitted in a set time interval (t) - (f=m/t). When the frequency of
messages increases by a factor of more than twice the normal value,
an anomaly is indicated. As we reported earlier, for an attack to be
successful, the rate of injection must be at least twice the normal
value. We implemented the frequency-based algorithm in our IDS.
Our IDS scans current CAN traffic and calculates the frequency of
messages for every CAN ID. If the frequency of messages deviates
at a rate of greater than 2 times normal, the IDS will indicate an
anomaly for said CAN ID.
It should be noted that this approach is relatively simple in
complexity as to be implemented in a simple OBD-II dongle. The
dongle is likely connected to the vehicle's OBD port and acts as
an additional ECU on the bus. In addition, this proposed method
is cost-effective since it does not require any modifications to the
native CAN bus.
4.1 Frequency Domain Analysis
We also performed a frequency domain analysis to assess the fre-
quency components of the time series CAN data. If the CAN mes-
sages have a constant frequency, it should show a singular peak
in the frequency domain. This frequency should change during an
attack if it affects the CAN message transmission rates. The time
series data for test vehicle 2 was converted into the frequency do-
main with the Fast Fourier Transform and investigated the effects
of different driving modes and message injection attacks. Some
data processing was needed to get the discrete CAN time signals
into a state which we could apply the Fourier Transform. The CAN
time stamps were converted into a square wave. The signal was
held high during transmission of the specific CANmessage and low
when the message was not transmitting. The sampling frequency
was (fs) as f s = D/t with the number of data points (D) and the
time interval (t). In our data sets, the amount of data points varies
depending on the CAN message. Typically, we had anywhere from
2000 to 8000 data points depending on CAN message in the logs.
With our timing interval, our average sampling frequency for our
CANmessages was 200 samples per second. One limitation in using
the FFT function is that the number of data points must be a number
that is a power of two. Some of our samples were padded with zeros
to meet this requirement.
Converting our time series data into square waves allowed us
to apply FFT to our data. We chose this representation of our data
to simulate the transmission and hold times of each CAN message
being transmitted on the bus. However, perfect square waves with
equal magnitude correspond to a FFT output with multiple fre-
quency peaks. Figure 5 shows that a square wave decomposes into
multiple sine waves at varying magnitudes. Messages that have a
single consistent message interval showed this ideal FFT behavior.
However, messages that demonstrated multiple timing intervals
had more complicated FFT output, as seen in Figure 6. We show
that multiple factors of CAN messages may affect the output of our
Fourier Transform, including rate of transmission, interval behavior
of messages, changes in driving mode, and normal variations in
normal timing.
To conduct a frequency analysis against an attack, we used the
same injection data from vehicle 2. During a message injection
attack, the frequency of messages is increased. However, we ob-
served during an attack, the frequency peaks stayed at the same
frequencies while the magnitude of the peaks changed. This result
makes sense when understanding that during an attack, the input
is now a duplicated square wave to the initial input. Attack traffic
is two square waves at the same frequency just offset from each
other, hence the FFT plot has the same frequency peaks but at a
higher magnitude. These results are reflected in Figure 7.
These results open the possibility that frequency domain analy-
sis is able to discern hidden features that are not present in simple
timing analysis. Further investigation is needed to determine the
applicability of frequency domain analysis towards intrusion detec-
tion.
4.2 Implementation and Evaluation
4.2.1 Vehicle Modes of Operation. We examined the two causes of
false positives and message timing irregularities: 1) Vehicle mode
of operation and 2) CAN message behavior. CAN message timing
intervals were affected by normal changes in the vehicle and gener-
ated false positives in anomaly detection. We chose to use message
frequency as opposed to message interval to handle these normal
behaviors and changes in the model of vehicle and in vehicles
themselves.
As the vehicle changed modes of operation, Table 2 shows the
rate of messages varies at a rate less than 20 percent. Our vehi-
cle had an average transmission rate of 4402 messages per second
through all modes of operation. Figure 8 shows an example CAN
message whose timing interval deviated when the vehicle changed
modes, hence generating false positives in an interval-based IDS.
We demonstrate that the frequency is more consistent as the ve-
hicle changes driving modes and eliminates these false positives.
We demonstrated that a successful message injection attack will
increase the rate of the injected message by more than a factor
of 2. Therefore, the variability in rate of messages during normal
operation is negligible when compared to the change caused by
injection attacks.
Additionally, we examined the messages that had varying mes-
sage intervals. As we discussed above, the timing intervals of these
Figure 5: Left plot depicts an ideal square wave, which rep-
resents the converted CAN message data. The messages get
transmitted at a fixed interval and have a certain transmis-
sion time represented by the duty cycle of the wave. The
right plot shows the Fourier transform of the square wave.
Table 2: Different Driving Modes Message Count
Driving Mode Time Duration (Seconds) Message Rate(Msgs/Sec)
Key ON 10 4448
Key ON to Start 10 4432
Shift to Reverse 15 4356
Accelerate Reverse 10 4351
Decelerate Reverse 10 4353
Shift to Drive 10 4352
Accelerate 15 4413
Maintain Speed 10 4513
Figure 6: On the left side there are two examples of CANmes-
sages with irregular timing intervals. The right side shows
their respective FFT outputs. Variations in the message tim-
ings can affect the FFT output.
Figure 7: As the message rate doubles during injection at-
tack, the magnitudes of certain frequency peaks will in-
crease.
Figure 8: CANmessage 0x7A variedwhen the vehicle shifted
drivingmodes. The timing interval increased by a factor of 2.
However, the message frequency of the same message over
the same driving transitions, the frequency does not vary
more than 5 percent.
messages demonstrate inconsistent behavior. There are certain
points where the interval doubles its normal or there are multiple
intervals. However, the frequency of these messages never varies
more than 20 percent. This variation is within normal parameters.
Figure 9: A comparison of the effect message injection at-
tack has on the interval and frequency of CAN ID: 0x202.
Left: Message shows multiple variable timing intervals. In-
jection attack (red) alters the interval of messages by short-
ening them. Right: By changing timing to frequency, it is
clear when message injection attack is occurring, it can be
shown that the frequency is consistently at 200msgs per sec-
ond normally (blue).
The dips in message rate may be attributed to the delay caused by
higher priority messages on the bus as the vehicle is in operation
and are not indicative of malicious anomalies.
4.2.2 Message Injection Attack. The number of messages will in-
crease during a message injection attack and therefore the fre-
quency of certainmessageswill increase. To demonstrate the change
in frequency during an injection attack, we simulated an injection
attack with the backup light message with ID of 202. The attacks
were simulated by injecting malicious messages at a high enough
rate to override the normal vehicle operations through the ODB-II
port. It required a rate of at least 2 times faster than normal for
the desired attack to be successful, as in the backup light turned
on. We had 15 seconds of normal traffic, followed by 15 seconds of
message injection. This was then repeated for a total of 60 seconds.
The frequency doubles in rate during attacks.
Figure 9 shows the captured normal traffic is represented in the
blue. The frequency of this particular message was 200 messages
per second. The captured message frequency when we injected
messages is represented in red. Figure 9 shows that the frequency of
messages doubles to 400 message per second when we are injection
messages.
We evaluated our message frequency-based IDS against the mes-
sage injection attack for both test vehicles. Using normal traffic
data as the training data, we captured the normal frequency for
every CAN ID. The IDS then compared current captured traffic
and calculated the frequency for every message. If the frequency
increased by 2 times normal, an anomaly was indicated. Similar to
interval-based intrusion detection, as the injection rate increased,
so did the false positive rate. This is due to the increased amount of
malicious packets which at such a high rate will alter the timings of
normal messages. The results are summarized in Table 3. It shows
that the detection accuracy increased for all injection rates, while
decreasing false positives for vehicle 1. While interval detection
generated numerous false positives in vehicle 2, frequency-based
detection greatly improved detection and false positive rates. We
show that frequency-based detection has better detection rates and
maintains low rates of false positives compared to current interval-
based detection approaches even when applied to different vehicles.
Table 3: Comparison of Intrusion Detection Systems
Vehicle Detection Type Detection Accuracy False Positive
1 Interval 75% 0%Frequency 100% 0.7%
2 Interval 96.9% 30%Frequency 100% 1.4%
Moore et al. [9] Interval 99.9% 0.29%
Seo et al. [11] Generative Adversarial Nets 96.5% 3.8%
Kang et al. [5] Deep Neural Network 97.8% 1.6%
5 RELATEDWORK
Research into CAN bus security has shown the lack of security in
automotive systems. Koscher et al. [6] were the first to implement
and demonstrate practical attacks on vehicles. They were able to
launch attacks by directly interfacing with the OBD-II port. They
concluded vehicles should implement a intrusion detection method
to detect when a vehicle is being attacked. Checkoway et al. [3] later
demonstrated that a vehicle can be exploited remotely. They were
able to gain access to the vehicle without having prior physical
access, and attack the vehicle over a broad range of attack vec-
tors, including Bluetooth and infotainment systems. The authors
concluded that security practices in vehicles should use similar
methods as traditional networks to restrict access and improve
security.
Hoppe et al. [4] proposed an anomaly-based IDS that is placed
on the CAN bus so that it can listen to the network traffic. Their
proposed IDS would examine the rate of transmission of specific
messages and compares it to what is normal to detect additional or
missing messages. Deviations from the expected normal number of
messages transmitted are identified as anomalies.
Markovitz et al. [7] proposed a novel domain-aware anomaly
detection system for CAN bus traffic. They developed a greedy
algorithm to split CAN messages into fields and classify these fields
into specific types they observed. Their anomaly detection system
uses the classifiers to characterize the fields and build a model for
the messages, based on their field types in the learning phase.
Song et al. [12] and Moore et al. [9] both proposed intrusion de-
tection algorithms based on the regularity of CAN message timing
intervals. They evaluated how different types of message injec-
tion attacks affect the timing intervals of CAN messages. They
both determined that an anomaly detection system monitoring the
inter-signal wait times of CAN traffic can detect message injection
attacks.
Due to limited computational resources in the host platforms,
these works proposed simple intrusion detection systems based on
message interval timing. However, the effectiveness of an interval-
based IDS may degrade significantly due to the changes of time
intervals during transitions of vehicle driving modes. Thus, this
paper presents a new and simple algorithm that is based on mes-
sage frequency and is effective across transitions of vehicle driving
modes.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we demonstrated the basic premise that all CAN mes-
sages have consistent timing intervals is not true. Different vehicles
and changes in normal driving operation can alter these timing
intervals, this makes IDS approaches based on constant timing
intervals not reliable. We propose, implemented, and evaluated a
frequency-based approach that can resolve the issues encountered
by interval-based approaches. Besides just detecting message in-
jection attacks, our approach is able to handle timing variations
from normal driving behavior and can be implemented on multiple
vehicles. Our method is also light-weight as it does not require
changes to the native CAN, this makes our approach applicable to
a variety of vehicles.
Future work involves improving the detection and false positive
rates of our approaches and applying the IDS on more vehicles.
We aim to improve response times by shortening our timing win-
dow and we will classify which anomalies are actual intrusions to
improve false positive rates. Additionally, we aim to combine the
frequency-based approach with a rule-based IDS, similar to hybrid
IDSs seen in traditional computing systems. Currently, this detec-
tion approach only detects message injection attacks. When used
in combination with other detection approaches, we aim to create
a more comprehensive automotive intrusion detection system.
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